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Generalization of the model of conflict between
two armed groups
Nikolay K. Vitanov∗ and S. Panchev∗∗,∗∗∗
Abstract
The conflicts between armed groups often go on for years. The
classical model of such conflicts accounts for the number of partic-
ipants and for the technology level of the equipment of the groups.
Below we extend this model in order to account for events that are
present for limited time. As examples we discuss three kinds of such
events: inclusion of reserves, presence of epidemics and use of non-
conventional weapons. We show that if such events are not handled
properly by the leaders of the groups the corresponding group can lose
the conflict.
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1 Introduction
Population dynamics deals with coexistent animal or human populations
[1-4]. The most antagonistic relations among animal populations are the
predator-prey ones. Human populations are different as they can compete
economically or politically [5-8] or they can support fighting among armed
groups [9-10]. Several decades ago Richardson and Lanchester applied the
idea for mathematical modeling of arms races and military combats [11-12]
In our unstable world today such kind of modeling becomes highly actual
[13-14]
Usually the number of members and the quality of their equipment are
the most important characteristics of the armed groups. A general model
of conflict between two such groups (called the ”Red group” and the ”Blue
group”) is
dB
dt
= F (B,R; b, r),
dR
dt
= G(B,R; b; r)(1)
where R(t) and B(t) are the numbers of armed members of the two groups;
b and r account for the technology level of the equipment of the two groups;
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and F and G are linear or nonlinear functions, depending on the character of
the conflict. Epstein [15] discussed the following particular case of the model
(1)
dR
dt
= −bBc1Rc2 ,
dB
dt
= −rRc3Bc4(2)
where c1,2,3,4 are real nonnegative coefficients.
Below we generalize the model (1) by addition of terms which describe the
influence of different events acting for limited time. In section 3 we discuss
three simple cases of such events: inclusion of reserves, epidemics and use of
non-conventional weapons. Several concluding remarks are summarized in
section 4.
2 Generalization of the model (1)
Let us introduce the function
V (t, t1, t2, µ, ν) = Θ(t1){1− exp[ν(t1 − t)]} exp[Θ(t2)ν(t2 − t)](3)
where t2 > t1 and Θ is the Heaviside theta function. V describes the following
process: at t1 V grows from 0 to almost 1 and this growth is controlled by
the parameter µ. At t = t2 V begins an exponential decrease from 1 to 0.
This decrease is controlled by the parameter ν (see Fig. 1).
By means of the function V we can include different effects that act for
limited time. Three examples are
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Figure 1: The function V (t, T1, t2, µ, ν). Fig. 1a: long switch -on fast switch-
off (µ = 0.1, ν = 5.0). Fig. 1b: fast switch-on, fast switch-off (µ = ν = 5.0).
t1 = 2.5,t2 = 50 Fig. 1c: fast switch-on, fast switch-off, t1 = 2.5, t2 = 80.
the Red group (amplitude Hv).
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Dk and Hv can depend on parameters characterizing the kind of the non-
conventional weapon.
The general system of model equations becomes
dB
dt
= F (B,R; b, r) +
N1∑
i=1
BiV (t, t
(i)
1 , t
(i)
2 , µi, νi)−
−
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CjV (t, t
(j)
1 , t
(j)
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(k)
2 , µk, νk)(4)
dR
dt
= G(B,R; b, r) +
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3 Epidemics, reserves, non-conventional weapons
3.1 Epidemics in a position conflict
Let us assume that an epidemics situation exists for the Blue group from
time t1 to the time t2. The system of model equations become
dB
dt
= −rR− CV (t, t1, t2, µ, ν),
dR
dt
= −bR(6)
where we assume that the amplitude C connected to the epidemics is a
constant. Figure 2 illustrates the danger of epidemics. We have a Blue
group that at t = 0 is two times larger than the Red group and we have
an epidemics that starts at t = 20 and begins to decrease its death toll at
t = 80. At moderate ampltude of epidemics - Fig. 2a - the Blue group still
wins but if the amplitude of epidemics is large and there are no effective
countermeasures the two times larger Blue group loses the conflict as it can
be seen in Fig. 2b.
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Figure 2: Influence on an epidemics on the result of a position conflict. At
t = 0 the Blue group is two times numerous as the Red group: B0 = 200000,
R0 = 100000. The epidemics starts at t = 20 and it begins do decay rapidly
at t = 80. µ = ν = 3 and the firepower effectiveness of the two groups is
the same b = r = 0.0025. Figure (a) : amplitude of disease C = 1000 - Blue
group still wins. Figure (b): amplitude of disease C = 2000 - the Blue group
losses the conflict.
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3.2 Using reserves to counter an attack
Now let a five time larger Red group attacks the Blue group and the Blue
group has some reserve members that can be used in the conflict. We shall
consider here the case of including all reserves at once. The system of equa-
tions becomes
dR
dt
= −bRB,
dB
dt
= −rRB +B1V (t, t1, t2, µ, ν)(7)
The result from the attack depends on the quantity and the speed of intro-
duction of the reserves of the Blue group. Several outcomes are presented
in Fig. 3. If the reserves are enough but are not introduced fast enough
the attack of the Red group is successful. If the reserves are introduced fast
enough the Blue group stops the attack and wins. These observations con-
firm the existence of thresholds in the nonlinear systems. If the change of
the system is below the threshold the system eliminates the perturbation (as
in Fig. 3a). If the perturbation is large enough however (over the threshold)
the system state can be changed (as in Fig. 3c).
3.3 Nuclear strike in course of a position conflict
Now let a very large Red groups fights much smaller Blue group. Let the
Blue group has no alternative of use of non-conventional weapons and let it
performs a nuclear strike on the Red group. The system of model equations
is
dB
dt
= −rR,
dR
dt
= −bB −H1V (t, t1, t2, µ, ν)(8)
Results from this scenario are shown in Fig. 4. Here again we demonstrate
existence of a threshold. If the the nuclear strike is not massive enough (if
the intensity of the strike is below the threshold) there is no result - the
larger group wins. But if the strike is massive enough the situation changes
and the smaller Blue group wins.
4 Concluding remarks
More than 500 years ago Nicolo Machiavelli wrote that the people start a
war at will but end it when they can. In other words it is important to know
the consequences of the possible scenarios of a conflict. This can be achieved
even on the basis of simple mathematical models. May be the most important
conclusion from our results is that the armed group which defend a teritory
must not be reduced too much. If this happens then it is extremely difficult
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Figure 3: Influence of reserves on an attack. Red group of 500 000 man
attacks Blue group of 100 000 man. b = 10−6, r = 5 · 10−7. Blue group
introduces reserves from t = 10 till t = 20. µ = ν = 1. Figure (a): amplitude
B1 = 10
4. The Red army group. Figure (b): amplitude B1 = 1.7 · 10
7. The
Blue group stops the attack. Figure (c): amplitude B1 = 2.5 ·10
4. Disastrous
defeat for the Red group.
and costly to fight more numerous enemy. Another conclusion is that if the
dynamics of the armed conflict become nonlinear then the accounting for the
thresholds is crucial for the success. For and example the inclusion of reserves
must be massive or the nuclear strike must be large enough. Otherwise the
conflict can be lost.
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